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A Castle in the Sky: The Illusory Promise
of Labeling Genetically Modified Food in
Europe
Peter Burchett*
I.

Introduction
It is not from the benevolence of the butcher, the brewer, or the
baker, that we expect our dinner, but from their regard to their own
interest. We address ourselves, not to their humanity but to their selflove, and never talk to them of our necessities but of their
advantages.1

This economic maxim, published the year America declared its
independence, implies that self-interest is the unexcelled protector of the
consumer. In other words, consumers are protected by merchants' selfinterest in having a reputation for honest dealings and quality products.
Consumers are so protected because a loss of such reputation would
3
jeopardize the market value of a merchant's business. Thus, "greed is
good ' A because reputation is a major competitive tool and the
* 2004 Recipient of Penn State's RICHARD REEVE BAXTER AWARD, for outstanding
legal scholarship and student comment in the field of international law. J.D. Candidate,
The Pennsylvania State University, The Dickinson School of Law, 2005; B.S., Villanova
University, The College of Commerce & Finance, 2002. The author wishes to thank
Larry Catd Backer, Perrie H. Naides, and Louis F. Del Duca for their assistance with this
comment.
1. ADAM SMITH, THE WEALTH OF NATIONS 23 (Bantam Books 2003) (1776).
2. ALAN GREENSPAN, The Assault on Integrity, THE OBJECTIVIST NEWSLETTER
August 1963, reprintedin AYN RAND, CAPITALISM: THE UNKNOWN IDEAL 121 (Penguin

Books 1967) (1962) [hereinafter GREENSPAN].
3. Id.
4. Ivan F. Boesky, U.S. financier, Commencement address, School of Business
Administration, University of California, Berkeley (1986) (stating that "[gireed is all
right, by the way... I think greed is healthy. You can be greedy and still feel good about
yourself'). http://www.bartleby.com/66/63/7663.html (last accessed on June 25, 2004).
Boesky's words were later picked up in Oliver Stone's film, Wall Street (1987), spoken
by Gordon Gecko. Id. Boesky himself was later convicted of conspiring to file false
documents with the federal government, involving insider trading violations, and agreed
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fundamental force that guides economic behavior.5 This notion dictates
that government regulation of economic activity is an inferior means of
protecting consumers.
To be sure, this comment analyzes two European Union ("EU")
regulations that require food products containing genetically modified
organisms ("GMOs") 6 to bear labels7 indicating the presence of such
content. 8 As an alternative means to protect consumer interests, 9 these
regulations are the "world's strictest legislation" on genetically modified
("GM") product labeling. 10
As of April 2004, they create a
comprehensive framework to trace I I any GM food throughout the
product chain from farm to table, and provide consumers with detailed
information by12 labeling all foods consisting of, containing, or produced
from, a GMO.
Since the EU's implementation of a GM labeling, commentators
to pay $100 million in fines and illicit profits. Id. Of course, as Boesky would probably
now admit, too much of anything is never a good thing.
5. GREENSPAN, supra note 2.
6. Genetically modified organisms (GMOs) can be defined as organisms or microorganisms in which the genetic material (DNA) has been altered through a scientific
process of mating or natural recombination. See BAINBRIDGE JANET, BASMA ELLAHI &
GRAEME SMITH, GENETICALLY MODIFIED FOODS: A PRACTICAL GUIDE FOR BUSINESS 10

(John Whisson ed., Chandos Publishing (Oxford) Limited 2000) [hereinafter
BAINBRIDGE]. Foods containing GMOs can be addressed by a variety of equivalent
terms: bioengineered, genetically engineered (GE), genetically modified (GM),
genetically modified organisms (GMO). Id. This comment refers to such foods
interchangeably as GMs or GMOs.
7. For purposes of this comment, the term "label" or "labeling" means a display of
written, printed, or graphic matter upon the immediate container of any article or food
product. Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C. § 321(k) (2003) [hereinafter
FFDCA].
8. Council Regulation 1829/2003 of 22 September 2003 on genetically modified
food and feed, art. 1, 2003 O.J. (L 268) 5 [hereinafter Regulation 1829]; see also Council
Regulation 1830/2003 of 22 September 2003 concerning the traceability and labeling of
genetically modified organisms and the traceability of food and feed products produced
from genetically modified organisms and amending Directive 2001/18/EC, 2003 O.J. (L
268) 25 [hereinafter Regulation 1830].
9. Press Release, European Union, European Legislative Framework For GMOs Is
Now In Place (July 23, 2003), at http://www.eurunion.org/News/press/2003/
2003045.htm (last visited Oct. 21. 2003) [hereinafter EuropeanFramework.for GMOs].
10. Joseph Mercola, Europe Passes Tough GM Food Labeling Laws, at
http://www.mercola.com/vcgi/PrinterFriendly.fcgi (last visited Nov. 8, 2003) [hereinafter
Europe Passes Tough GM Food LabelingLaws].
11. "Trace" or "traceability" refers to the means to track the movement of GM
products through the production and distribution chains.
See Commission
Recommendation of 23 July 2003 on guidelines for the development of national
strategies and best practices to ensure the coexistence of genetically modified crops with
conventional and organic farming (notified under document number C ((2003) 2624),
2003 O.J. (L 189) 36 [hereinafter Commission Recommendation].
12. See European Frameworkfor GMOs, supra note 9, at http://www.eurunion. org/
News/press/2003/2003045.htm.
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have been divided as to whether the EU's new labeling framework really
promotes "consumer interests."' 3 Some consumer organizations and
environmental groups celebrate the regulations as a triumph of consumer
choice over corporate interests.' 4 Other consumer advocates, however,
claim that the new regulations do nothing to make food safer or give
consumers better information about the products they buy.' 5 These
critics argue that the EU's labeling framework gives consumers a false
sense of security and imposes substantial costs on farmers' ability to sell
their products.16
The United States, which does not require mandatory labeling of
GM foods, 17 claims the EU's regulations will cost American farmers
over $300 million per year in lost exports.' 8 Some economists believe
these lost exports will undercut the protection consumers already gain
from GM food producers' incentive to make money and have a
reputation for honest dealings and quality food products.' 9 In fact, one
economist believes that such factors diminish food producers' incentive
to scrupulous performance-the built-in safeguard of a free enterprise
system and the only real protector of the consumer against business
dishonesty. 20
This comment critiques the EU's new regulatory framework that
mandates the labeling of GM food products. It proceeds in four parts.
Part II briefly reviews the arguments for and against the use of GM
technology and the purpose of GM labeling. Part III compares the
labeling laws in the U.S. and the EU and the respective attempts in each
system to promote consumer interests.
Part IV argues that, like Gresham's Law,2 1 the EU's labeling
13.

See Europe Passes Tough GM Food Labeling Laws, supra note 10 (quoting

Regulation 1829, supra note 10, at art.l(a)); see also More Trouble Ahead: New EU
Rules Will Rile America, THE ECONOMIST, July 5, 2003, WL 58583108, 1-2 [hereinafter
More Trouble Ahead].
14. More Trouble Ahead, supra note 13, at 1-2.
15. Id.
16. Europe Passes Tough GM Food Labeling Laws, supra note 10, at
http://www.mercola.com/vcgi/PrinterFriendly.fcgi.
17. Larry Thompson, Are BioengineeredFoods Safe?, 34 FDA CONSUMER 1 (2000),
WL 11603505 [hereinafter FDA CONSUMER].
18. More Trouble Ahead, supra note 13, at 2.
19. Id.
20. GREENSPAN, supra note 2.
21. This is the observation that "bad money drives out good." Gresham's Law,
BRITANNICA CONCISE ENCYCLOPEDIA, Encyclopedia Britannica Premium Service,
available at http://www.britannica.com/ebc/article?eu=391446 (last visited Nov. 20,
2003). The observation is named for Sir Thomas Gresham (1519-1579), financial agent
of Queen Elizabeth I, who was one of the first to elucidate it. Id. The meaning expressed
is that, if two coins have the same face value but are made from metals of unequal value,
the cheaper will tend to drive the other out of circulation; the more valuable coin will be
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regulations drive out "good" consumer protection with "bad" consumer
protection in two ways. First, the EU's labeling "guarantee" undermines
consumers' exercise in judgment over the choice of goods and services
they purchase. In other words, the EU's regulations drive up the cost of
GM food products, making them less desirable to consumers when
compared to substantially similar non-GM products. The effect on GM
food producers will be a decrease in market share, which ultimately
decreases the range of products from which consumers are able to
choose. Second, the EU's minimum GM labeling standards, which are
the basis of the regulations, will become the maximums that are difficult
to enforce. This effect is likely because the guiding purpose of the EU's
labeling framework is prevention rather than creation. This purpose is
problematic because it relies too heavily on EU Member States, rather
than the voluntary efforts of the private sector, to regulate the market for
food.
Part IV concludes that the EU's new labeling regulations impose a
regime that replaces the self-interest of the GM food producer as the
ultimate means to protect consumers with an illusory protection that fails
to build quality into GM food products or accuracy into GM labeling.
These regulations, therefore, undermine consumer protection by
abnegating the natural and potent incentive of the butcher, the brewer, or
the baker to achieve success in the marketplace by possessing those
virtues that best serve consumers-integrity and trustworthiness.22
Part V addresses the two harms discussed in Part IV, and suggests
approaches for lawyers representing American or EU food producers to
consider when counseling their clients on participation in the EU
marketplace.
Although these suggestions are not exhaustive, they
provide practitioners with solutions to mitigate the costs imposed under
the new EU framework.
II.

The Promise, Peril, and Purpose of GM Product Labeling

Although there has been a great deal of controversy over the use of
GMOs in food products,23 the notion of genetic modification, or genetic
engineering, is a concept that has been around for over a hundred years.24
In the late nineteenth century, a scientist named Gregor Mendel
discovered that the genetics of plants could be altered by cross-fertilizing
two related plants so the resulting offspring had the desired
hoarded or used for foreign exchange instead of for domestic transactions. Id.
22. GREENSPAN, supra note 2, at 122.
23. See, e.g., Barnaby J. Feder; Rocky Outlook for Genetically Engineered Crops,
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 20, 1999, at C8; Craig R. Whitney, Fear of Feeding: Europe Loses Its
Appetite for High Tech Food,N.Y. TIMES, June 27, 1999, § 4, at 3.
24. BAINBRIDGE, supra note 6, at 10.
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characteristics of both parent plants. 25 Today, genetic modification 26 is a
modem-day extension of Mendel's selective breeding methods 27 that
accelerates cross-fertilization in a controlled, non-random manner with a
more predictable outcome.28
A.

The Promises of GM Foods
The promises of GM foods include improvements in yield and
31

flexibility, 29 improvements in food quality,

environmental benefits,

and more productive and useful industrial crops.3 2 These results enable
GM foods to have improved keeping quality, higher resistance to
inclement weather, increased levels of nutrients, and better taste or

25. See FDA CONSUMER, supra note 17, at 2.
26. "Genetic modification" means the alteration of the genotype of a plant using any
technique, new or traditional, that inserts one or more genes into a plant to give it an
advantageous characteristic to enable it to grow easier. Statement of Policy: Foods
Derived from New Plant Varieties, 57 Fed. Reg. 22,984 (FDA May 29, 1992), WL
112827 [hereinafter FDA Statement of Policy]. "Modification" is used in a broad context
to mean the alteration in the composition of food that results from adding, deleting, or
changing hereditary traits, irrespective of the method. Id. Modifications may be minor,
such as a single mutation that affects one gene, or major alterations of genetic material
that affect many genes. Id.
27. Proponents maintain that the new techniques of genetic modification are an
extension of "selective breeding" methods, and widen the pool of genes from which
traditional breeders can draw. See BAINBRIDGE, supra note 6, at 7-8. "[S]cientists argue
that genetic modification has always occurred in the process of evolution and that it is the
basis for the 'selective breeding' of plants and animals over hundreds of generations to
produce varieties suitable for human needs in a shorter time period." Id.
28. Id. at 9. Genetically modified foods entered the global food system in the early
1990s and are now in a wide selection of raw and processed foods. PETER W.B. PHILLIPS
& HEATHER MCNEILL, LABELLING FOR GM FOODS: THEORY AND PRACTICE, reprinted in
SANTANIELLO,
VITTORIO, ROBERT E. EVENSON, DAVID ZILBERMAN, "MARKET
DEVELOPMENT FOR GENETICALLY MODIFIED FOODS 245 (CABI Publishing 2002)

[hereinafter SANTANIELLO].

29. Measures of this kind reduce the unit costs of food production by increasing
yields reducing production costs and improving flexibility of crop management. See
FDA CONSUMER, supra note 17, at 2. These measures include herbicide and pest
resistance, greater resilience to elements such as frost, market genes to identify disease at
an earlier stage, and increasing milk yields and slower ripening decay. Id.
30. Such improvements increase nutritional value, reduce allergens, and improve
taste and convenience, such as seedless watermelon or potatoes that absorb less fat. See
CYNTHIA A. ROBERTS, THE FOOD SAFETY INFORMATION HANDBOOK 39 (Oryx Press 2001)
[hereinafter ROBERTS].

31. GM crops offer the potential for less frequent spraying with more degradable
herbicides, less fertilizer, less land under cultivation, more natural growth on agricultural
land, and more insect life. Id. at 41.
32. GM offers improved efficiency and quality of production of chemicals already
extracted from plants, such as starch from potatoes and paper pulp from trees. See
GREGORY E. PENCE, DESIGNER FOOD: MUTANT HARVEST OR BREADBASKET OF THE

WORLD? 71 (Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc. 2002) [hereinafter PENCE].
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texture.33
In practice, "food biotechnology holds much promise for addressing
world food problems, most notably the overall shortfall in food
production expected early in the twenty-first century. 3 4 GM technology
can also benefit developing countries in the areas of pest resistance,
resilience to climatic range, and in ripening speed.35 As a result, GM
foods offer a new potential for those countries plagued with poor
of
growing conditions because they "[improve] the nutritional 3quality
6
indigenous food plants on which so many populations depend.
B.

The PotentialPerils of GM Foods

Although there is no scientific evidence to suggest that genetic
modification of foods has caused or is likely to cause harm to the
environment or human health, some anti-biotechnology advocates claim
that GM foods pose a potential threat to human health and to the
environment.3 7 The potential human health threats include toxicity and
allergic reactions,38 antibiotic resistance,3 9 unintentional changes,40 and
transfer of novel genetic material to the consumer. 1
'A2
The potential environmental costs include "gene transfer,
33.
34.

BAINBRIDGE, supra note 6, at 9.
MARION NESTLE, SAFE FOOD: BACTERIA, BIOTECHNOLOGY, AND BIOTERRORISM

146 (University of California Press 2003) [hereinafter NESTLE]. By some estimates, the
global demand for rice, wheat, and maize will increase by 40% above current levels as
early as 2020. Id.
35. Given supporting aid to finance it, GM technology can benefit developing
countries, especially in areas of pest resistance, resilience to climatic range, and in slower
ripening. PENCE, supra note 32, at 78.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 73.
38. This is the possibility that GM food could inadvertently contain proteins that are
toxic to humans or cause allergic reactions. See ROBERTS, supra note 30, at 41.
39. There are two main concerns arising from the presence of antibiotic resistant
genes in some GM foods-that bacteria in the human gut could become resistant to
antibiotics and spread that resistance to other bacteria, and that the presence of these
genes in GM food could affect the performance of antibiotics used in medical treatment.
See id.
40. The imprecise nature of some GM techniques may result in unintended impacts
on the plant's characteristics, which may be harmful to humans. See RONNIE CUMMINS &
BEN LILLISTON,

GENETICALLY

ENGINEERED

FOOD: A SELF-DEFENSE

GUIDE FOR

CONSUMERS 96-97 (Marlowe & Company 2000) [hereinafter CUMMINS].
41. There is some concern that "manufactured" gene sequences could be transferred
to consumers with unknown consequences. See ROBERTS, supra note 30, at 41.
42. There is a possibility that modified genes may be transferred from crops to other
species of plants or to microorganisms in the soil. See DANIEL CHARLES, LORDS OF THE
HARVEST: BIOTECH, BIG MONEY, AND THE FUTURE OF FOOD 284 (Perseus Publishing
2001) [hereinafter CHARLES]. The extent to which this may be harmful depends on which
characteristics are transferred to which plant species. Id. The spread of genes
responsible for herbicide tolerance to non-target plant species, for example, could clearly
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competition with non-GM crops, 43 pest resistance, 44 impacts on herbicide
use,45 and various biodiversity issues. 46 These issues are of greater
concern in Europe than in the United States 47 because "Americans tend
to have more positive attitudes toward technology, greater ' trust
in
48
regulatory agencies, and less immediate contact with agriculture.
C. The Purpose of GM Labeling
Labeling is used to deliver information to consumers about
characteristics of products that they are not able to evaluate in order to
provide reasonable assurances of food content.4 9 Using this information,
consumers can make positive choices to avoid foods that raise nutritional
or health concerns they may have.50 Given the extensive trade in GM
foods and food products, 5' many consumers are uncertain about what
be damaging. Id.
43. Some commentators are concerned that beneficial characteristics in GM crops
might lead those crop plants to spread and start to compete with wild species, becoming a
pest. See David R. Nicholson, Agricultural Biotechnology and Genetically-Modified
Foods: Will the Developing World Bite?, 8 VA. J.L. & TECH. 7, 10-11 (2003) [hereinafter
Will the Developing World Bite?].
44. There is evidence that some insect species have evolved to become resistance to
plants that are genetically modified for insect resistance through the introduction of genes
that enables production of toxins. See id. at 15.
45. Environmental groups believe that the use of herbicide resistant GM crops will
encourage more widespread use of herbicides that, in turn, could have damaging
environmental effects. Press Release, Greenpeace, Engineered Corn Could Harm More
Than 100 Butterfly Species, Greenpeace Wams, at http://www.greenpeaceusa.
org/features/europebutterfly.htm (last visited Dec. 29, 2003) [hereinafter Greenpeace
Statement on Chemicals]; but see PETER PRINCE, FOOD INC.: THE PROMISES AND PERILS OF
THE BIOTECH HARVEST 67 (Simon & Schuster 2003) [hereinafter PRINCE] (explaining that
companies developing GM crops claim the use of GM material will lead to reductions in
herbicide use).
46. There are fears that some environmental impacts could lead to wider impacts on
levels of biodiversity if, for example, widespread use of insect resistant GM varieties led
to reductions in the numbers of insects and insect species, then this would have other
impacts on the ecosystem such as impacts on bird populations that interact with these
insect species.
Greenpeace Statement on Chemicals, supra note 45, at
http://www.greenpeaceusa.org/features/europebutterfly.htm.
47. For example, in 1999, 79 percent of the British public thought GM crop testing
should be stopped. See Warren Hoge, Britons Skirmish Over Genetically Modified
Crops, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 23, 1999, at A3 [hereinafter Britons Skirmish Over Genetically
Modified Crops].
48. Id.
49. Julie A. Caswell, Labeling Policy For GMOs: To Each His Own?, THE JOURNAL
OF AGROBIOTECHNOLOGY, MANAGEMENT & ECONOMICS, available at AgBioForum
http://www.agbiofonim.missouri.edu (last visited Jan. 10, 2004) [hereinafter Labeling
Policy For GMOs].
50. PAUL B. THOMPSON, FOOD BIOTECHNOLOGY IN ETHICAL PERSPECTIVE 77 (Kluwer

Academic Publishers 1997) [hereinafter

THOMPSON].

51. See also MARK L. WINTSON, TRAVELS IN THE GENETICALLY
(Harvard University Press 2002) [hereinafter WINTSON].
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they are consuming and argue that labeling will allow them to make their
own choices about GM food.52 Labels enable food producers to respond
to these demands by matching those producers that use different
technologies with consumers who want to buy GM or non-GM
products.53
Regulatory labeling requirements can be either voluntary or
a
Voluntary labeling allows companies to choose 55
mandatory. 4
production process and labeling scheme that maximizes profit.
Voluntary systems also allow consumers to make choices based on a
range of price and process attributes offered in the market. 6 Unlike
voluntary labeling, mandatory labeling requires GMOs to be defined,
labeled, and segregated from non-GM products throughout the supply
chain, from seed inputs to the supermarket shelf 5 7 Mandatory systems
is required regardless
are opposed by the food industry because labeling
58
used.
technology
the
of
acceptance
of the market
III.

The Labeling of GM Foods in the United States and the European
Union

Mandatory labeling is a political issue rather than a simple matter of
consumer information in Europe because the food industry strongly
opposes it and the U.S. government supports the industry's position.5 9
Food producers prefer a voluntary labeling system because they are
anxious not to label GM food in a way that misleads consumers or
damages sales. 60 Nevertheless, the EU has expressed concern over the
61
use and safety of GM technology in the development of food products.
52.

See SANTANIELLO, supra note 28, at 245-6.

53.

CAMPBELL R.

MCCONNELL &

STANLEY L. BRUE, ECONOMICS: PRINCIPLES,

PROBLEMS, AND POLICIES 591 (McGraw-Hill 1996) (1963) [hereinafter MCCONNELL].
See SANTANIELLO, supra note 28, at 248.
54. See SANTANIELLO, supra note 28, at 248. Voluntary labeling has been adopted

by the United States, Canada, and Argentina. Id. at 249. Mandatory labeling has been
adopted by the EU, its member states, and 15 other countries. Id. at 250.
55. Julie A. Caswell, Should Use Of GeneticallyModified OrganismsBe Labeled?,
THE JOURNAL OF AGROBIOTECHNOLOGY,

MANAGEMENT, & ECONOMICS, available at

AgBioForum http://www.agbioforum.missouri.edu (last accessed Jan. 10, 2004)
[hereinafter Should Use Of Genetically Modified Organisms Be Labeled?].
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. NESTLE, supra note 34, at 222.
60. THOMPSON, supra note 50, at 77.
Europeans are also concerned with
61. BAINBRIDGE, supra note 6, at 27.
environmental safety of GM foods, such as their potential impact on biodiversity and the
possibility that they may lead to the creation of "super weeds" or pesticide-resistant
insects. See Karen A. Goldman, Labeling of Genetically Modified Foods: Legal and
Scientific Issues, 12 GEO. INT'L ENVTL. L. REv. 717, 720 (2000).
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Paradoxically, European laws regulating GM foods have
traditionally focused on consumer choice, rather than on the safety of
GM foods, as the primary goal of regulation.6 2 This duality reflects
European consumers' perception that GM foods have negative
characteristics, 63 which contrasts that of Americans who generally
64
perceive GM foods to have more neutral or positive characteristics.
The labeling regulations of GM foods in the U.S. and the EU provide for
an interesting comparison 65 because the labeling regimes of both states
are not homogenous.6 6
A.

Labeling and the Promotion of Consumer Interests in the United
States

1. The FDA Does Not Generally Require Mandatory Labeling of
GM Foods under the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act
Pursuant to its authority under the Federal Food, Drug, and
Cosmetic Act ("FFDCA"),67 the Food and Drug Administration ("FDA")
regulates the labeling of all GM foods bought or sold in the United
States.68 The FFDCA creates a voluntary labeling system under which
the FDA does not generally require that food producers disclose on
product labels whether a product contains a GMO or the method used to
manufacture a GM product. 69 The FDA reasons that such disclosure
would be misleading 70 and would "erroneously imply that GM foods
differ from conventional foods and that conventional foods are in some
' 71
way superior.
The FDA maintains that the voluntary labeling system avoids the
62. European Commission Memorandum 97/110 on Labeling of Genetically
Modified Organisms, 1997, 1-2. See also Council Regulation 1139/98 of May 1998
Concerning the Compulsory Indication of the Labeling of Certain Foodstuffs Produced
from Genetically Modified Organisms of Particulars Other than Those Provided for in
Directive 79/112/EEC, 1998 O.J. (L 159) 4-7.
63. SANTANIELLO, supra note 28, at 37.
64. Id.
65. Because this topic has been written on extensively, the following sections are
meant to offer a brief overview of the labeling laws and the underlying rationale
supporting such laws. See, e.g., Goldman, supra note 98, at 717; see also Lara Beth
Winn, Special LabelingRequirementsfor GeneticallyEngineered Food: How Sound Are
the Analytical Frameworks Used by FDA and Food Producers?54 FOOD DRUG L.J. 667,
672 (1999).
66. SANTANIELLO, supra note 28, at 258.
67. See FFDCA, supra note 7, at §§ 301-393 (2003).
68. FDA Statement of Policy, supra note 26, at 22,984.
69. Id.
70. BAINBRIDGE, supra note 6, at 27.
71. NESTLE, supra note 34, at 222.
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possibility of misinforming the consumer by requiring GM foods to be
labeled if they "differ substantially" from their conventional non-GM
products.7 2 This concept, known as "equivalence, 7 3 holds that if a GM
food product differs from the conventional counterpart in either
nutritional value or allergenic content, thus reducing its equivalence to its
non-GM counterpart, the product must indicate this material difference
on its label.74 The concept of equivalence highlights the aim of the
FFDCA to prevent
deception and "to enable purchasers to buy food for
75
what it really is."
The FDA recognizes that if genetic modifications change a plant's
nutritional composition or introduce a potential allergen into that plant
product, foods containing those plants must be labeled by using a new
standard name that indicates the GM plant's presence or its
nonequivalence to the conventional plant product.7 6 Although the FDA
encourages voluntary labeling, this particular requirement alerts
consumers to the material differences, such as nutritional or allergenic
changes, in the "new" product compared to the makeup of its
"conventional" counterpart.77
2.
The FDA's Voluntary System of Labeling Does Not Require
Food Producers to Indicate the Method Used to Manufacture a Product
Under the FDA's voluntary labeling system, food producers are not
required to indicate the method used to manufacture the products.78
Although the method of food manufacturing may seem to offer insight
into the safety or nutritional characteristics of a food product, the FDA
believes the key factors in reviewing safety concerns are the
characteristics of the food product, rather than the methods used to

72. FDA Statement of Policy, supra note 26, at 22,984.
73. Press Release, European Union, EU Commission Memo Questions and Answers
at
http://europa.eu.int/rapid/start/gt&doc=MEMO/
(October
15,
2002),
02/16001RAPID&lg=EN&display.html (last visited Nov. 24, 2003) [hereinafter EU
Commission Questions and Answers].
74. Information disclosing differences in performance characteristics, such as
ephysical properties, flavor characteristics, functional properties, or shelf life, is a
material fact under the FFDCA because it bears on the consequence of the use of the
article. Accordingly, this information must be communicated to the consumer on the
product label, or labeling would be misleading. See Requirements for Foods Named by
Use of a Nutrient Content Claim and a Standardized Term, 21 C.F.R. § 130 (1993).
75. See U.S. v. Ninety-Five Barrels, More or Less, Alleged Apple Cider Vinegar,
Douglass Packing Co., 265 U.S. 438, 443 (1924); see also FDA Statement of Policy,
supra note 26, at 22,984; FDA CONSUMER, supra note 17, at 5.
76. Id.
77. FDA Statement of Policy, supra note 26, at 22,984.
78. Id.
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develop such products. 79 The FDA does not mandate that GM food
labels reveal information about the method of GM food development
because it is not "material" and because genetic engineering is just an
extension of other traditional
forms of plant breeding, which has never
80
been disclosed on labels.
The legal basis of the FDA's voluntary labeling policy has been
recognized by the U.S. Supreme Court, which held that "[w]hen
considered independently of the product, the method of manufacture is
not material., 8 1 The FDA believes that disclosure of the method used to
manufacture GM foods should be voluntary because all food producers,
by law, must ensure that their products pass the FDA's safety
standards. 82 If a food product does not pass the scrutiny of the FDA's
safety standards, the FDA has the authority to remove it from the
market.83
3.
FFDCA

Judicial Interpretations and the FDA's Implementation of the

Stauber v. Shalala illustrates the FDA's voluntary labeling
requirements.84 In Stauber, the plaintiffs challenged the FDA's decision
not to require labeling of products using cow milk treated with a GM
protein hormone called rbST.85 The plaintiffs argued that milk derived
from rbST-treated cows differed "organoleptically ' '86 from ordinary milk
in several respects and that these differences constituted "material facts"

79. Id.
80. Id.
81. U.S. v. Ninety-Five Barrels, More or Less, Alleged Apple Cider Vinegar,
Douglass Packing Co., 265 U.S. 438, 445 (1924) (considering whether vinegar made
from dried apples was "misbranded" when the label on the vinegar indicated that the
apples were fresh. Id. at 440. The Court concluded that the vinegar was misbranded
because the extract of dried apples plus water is not equivalent in composition to the juice
of fresh apples. Id. at 445. The Court emphasized that the misrepresentation was in
respect of the vinegar itself, and did not relate to the method of production. Id.).
82. See FDA CONSUMER, supra note 17, at 6. The FDA's safety standards require
that food producers send the FDA documents summarizing the information and data they
have generated to demonstrate that a bioengineered food is as safe as the conventional
food. Id. FDA scientists then review the information to ensure that the substance with an
unknown safety profile is not added to food without the manufacturer proving to the
government that the additive is safe. Id.
83. Id.
84. See Stauber v. Shalala, 895 F. Supp. 1178, 1187 (D. Wi. 1995); see also
International Dairy Foods Ass'n v. Amestoy, 898 F. Supp. 246, 249 (D. Vt. 1995).
85. Stauber, 895 F. Supp. at 1182-4.
86. An "organoleptic" difference is one capable of being detected by a human sense
organ. THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (Houghton
Mifflin Company 2000).
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requiring labeling.8 7 They also argued that widespread consumer desire
of rbST-derived milk was a "material fact"
for mandatory labeling
88
labeling.
requiring
The court disagreed that these were material facts that mandated
disclosure on labels for two reasons. 89 First, the plaintiffs were not able
to show that rbST altered the performance characteristics of milk or that
it had a significant effect on the overall composition of milk.90 Second,
that
the court held that the plaintiffs were incorrect in their assertion
91
labeling.
require
to
suffice
could
itself,
by
opinion,
consumer
Although the FDA does recognize consumer opinion as a relevant
factor when determining whether a label is required to disclose a material
fact, 92 the court in Stauber held that "a factual predicate to the
requirement of labeling is a determination that a product differs
materially from the type of product it purports to be." 93 Therefore, if a
GM product does not materially differ from what it purports to be, "then
as different, even if
it would [also] be misbranding to label the product
94
different.,
as
product
the
misperceived
consumers
In reaching the same conclusion as the FDA, that a voluntary
system prevents misbranding and misperception, the Stauber court
recognized that the FFDCA provides no basis for requiring labeling of
when there is no material
foods produced from genetic modification
95
characteristics.
product's
change in the
4.
The "Genetically Engineered Food Right to Know Act" and
the Preservation of the FDA's Voluntary Labeling Policy
In November of 1999, U.S. Representative Dennis Kucinich (D OH) introduced legislation known as the "Genetically Engineered Right
96
to Know Act," which contradicted the FDA's voluntary labeling policy.
87. Stauber, 895 F. Supp. at 1193.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. FDA Statement of Policy, supra note 26.
93. Stauber, 895 F. Supp. at 1193.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Genetically Engineered Food Right to Know Act, H.R. 2916, 106th Cong. § 2(3)
(1999) [hereinafter "Genetically Engineered Food Right to Know Act"]. By February
2000, this bill had the support of 48 congressional members, which is equal to about ten
percent of the voting members. See SANTANIELLO, supra note 28, at 250. Although the
bill ultimately did not pass, as a result of these efforts there has been an increase in local
efforts to impose new labeling rules. Id. As of May 2000, sixteen U.S. states had
introduced bills that would require labeling for GM foods. Id. (referencing E. NIILER,
Local efforts to enforce GMfood labeling are thwarted,NATURE BIOTECHNOLOGY, 18(6),
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The bill claimed that because genetic engineering changes foods in
significant ways, thus producing material changes, "federal agencies
have failed to uphold Congressional intent by allowing genetically
engineered foods to be marketed, sold and otherwise
used without
97
labeling that reveals material facts to the public."
One of the main reasons the bill did not pass was because it would
have eliminated the FDA's voluntary labeling system and required that
all foods containing GM ingredients be labeled, even if they did not
materially differ from their non-GM conventional counterparts. 98 One
commentator expressed that the bill placed "politics ahead of sound
science," 99 and that "Kucinich apparently believes that Congress-rather
than the FDA, the scientific community or the public-is best equipped
to address food biotechnology and consumer concern."' 00 The National
Food Processors Association recognized the FDA is better equipped
because "[t]he American public has far more confidence in the FDA's
ability to make sound, scientific decisions
on biotechnology than it does
31
so.'
do
to
politicians
of
ability
the
in
B.

Labeling and the Promotion of Consumer Interests in the European
Union

The major thrust of the EU's efforts to regulate GM foods over the
past ten years has focused on consumers' right to information by using
labeling "as a tool to make an informed choice."' 2 On July 22, 2003, the
European Parliament formally adopted two proposals that completed the
EU's framework for regulating GM foods.10 3 Although the cultivation
590).
97. Id.
98. Press Release, National Food Processors Association, NFPA Faults Introduction
of Biotech Labeling Bill (Nov. 11, 1999) (on file with author). NFPA is the voice of the
$460 billion food processing industry on scientific and public policy issues involving
food safety, nutrition, technical and regulatory matters and consumer affairs. Id.
99. Id. (quoting Kelly Johnston, Executive Vice President of Government Affairs
and Communications of National Food Processors Association).
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Memorandum from the Delegation of the European Commission to the United
States, EU Law and Policy Overview on Genetically Modified Foods, available at
http://www.eurunion.org/legislat/Foodstuffs/NovelFoods.htm (last visited Nov. 24, 2003)
103. See European Frameworkfor GMOs, supra note 9, at http://www.eurunion.
org/News/press/2003/2003045.htm. 1829 and 1830 are two of the three main legal texts
that constitute the EU framework on GMOs. Id. The third piece of legislation, known as
the Deliberate Release Directive, was enacted in 2001 and contains the rules regarding
the deliberate release of GMOs into the environment and the relevant legislation for
granting permission to sell new GM crops in the EU. See Directive 2001/18/EC of the
European Parliament and of the Council of 12 March 2001 on the deliberate release into
the environment of genetically modified organisms and repealing Council Directive
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and labeling of GM crops and their import as commodities has been
regulated at the EU level since 1990, Regulation (EC) No 1829/2003
(hereinafter "1829") 104 and Regulation (EC) No 1830/2003 (hereinafter
"1830") 105 impose full traceability of GMOs throughout the supply chain
from farm to table, and provide consumers with comprehensive
information by labeling all food consisting of, containing, or produced
from a GMO. 1°6
1829 and 1830 signify the completion of the EU's legislation on
GMOs 10 7 and became effective in April of 2004.108 The following
sections outline the mandatory labeling provisions of 1829 and 1830 and
their relation to the food producer and the consumer.
1.

The EU Requires Mandatory Labeling of GMOs as a Class

Unlike the FDA's voluntary labeling policy, the EU establishes
thresholds for the percentage content of GM material above which foods
must be labeled as containing or being produced from a GMO. 0 9
Although the EU's mandatory labeling policy also seeks to promote
consumer interests, it differs from the FDA's labeling rules in two
notable ways.
First, foods with an adventitious, 0 or technically unavoidable,
presence of GM material are regulated based on whether they are
"authorized" or "not authorized" for sale in the EU. " In general, foods
90/220/EC, 2001 O.J. (L106) [hereinafter Directive 2001/18/EC]. Directive 2001/18/EC
has been amended by Regulation 1829. See Regulation 1829, supra note 8, at 17.
104. Concerns the authorization and labeling of genetically modified food and feed
and amends the GM part of Regulation (EC) No 258/97 [hereinafter Regulation (EC) No
258/97] of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 January 1997 concerning
novel food ingredients. See Regulation 1829, supra note 8, at 11.
105. Regulation 1830 ensures that relevant information concerning any genetic
modification is available at each stage of the placing on the market of GMOs and food
and feed produced there from and should thereby facilitate accurate labeling. See
Regulation 1830, supra note 8, at 26. The labeling and traceability regulation entered
force on 7 November 2003 and will apply 90 days from publication of a system for
development and assignment of unique identifies for GMOs. Id.
106. EU Commission Questions and Answers, supra note 73, at 5.
107. European Frameworkfor GMOs, supranote 9.
108. 1829 and 1830 shall enter into force on the 20th day following that of its
publication in the Official Journalof the European Union. See Regulation 1829, supra
note 8, at 22; see also Regulation 1830, supra note 8, at 28. The regulations shall apply
from six months after the date of publication of this Regulation. Id. 1829 and 1830 were
published in the Official Journalof the European Union on October 18, 2003, and will
therefore apply six months after this date or on April 18, 2003. Id.
109. See Regulation 1829, supra note 8, at 12.
110. "Adventitious" implies that the presence of GM material is accidental or

technically unavoidable.

THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH
LANGUAGE (Houghton Mifflin Company 2000).

111.

"Authorization" is governed by Directive 2001/18/EC which provides that
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that are not authorized are more strictly regulated than foods that are
authorized." 2 Second, all foods produced from GMOs, irrespective of
whether there is DNA or protein of a GM origin in the final product, or if
the final product does not materially differ from its conventional
counterpart, must be labeled." 3 The following sections examine these
differences along with the EU's labeling requirements for non-GM food
products.'l4
a.

The scope of the EU's mandatory labeling framework

Regulation 1829 mandates that food products that contain or consist
of GMOs, or are produced from or contain ingredients produced from
GMOs, must bear labels if they are to be delivered to the final consumer
or mass caterers.' 5 However, the unintended presence of GM material
in food products is largely unavoidable and can occur during cultivation,
handling, storage or transport." 16 For this reason, the EU established a
threshold for the adventitious presence of GM material in foods." 7 For
products containing GM material under this threshold, the EU Parliament
believes that "such presence of GMOs should.., not trigger labeling and
traceability requirements."' " 8 If a product contains GM material above
this threshold," 9 it must bear a label stating that it contains GMOs.' 0
whether the GM
However, the labeling threshold varies depending on
2'
EU.'
the
in
sale
for
authorized
is
question
material in
(1)

"Authorized" GM Food Products

For food products containing GM content authorized for sale in the
EU, the threshold for such products must contain, consist of, or be

approval for commercial cultivation and use of GMOs in products can be refused only on
grounds of risks to human health or environmental safety. See Directive 2001/18/EC,
supra note 103. Once a GM variety has received approval, it is authorized for use
throughout the EU, in line with European single market principles, and in general no
individual Member State may prohibit, restrict or impede its use. See Regulation 1829,
supra note 8, at 5.
112. See Regulation 1829, supra note 8, at 7.
113. Id.
114. Id. at 11.
115. Id.
116. See CHARLES, supra note 42, at 291-2. However, this is not a problem that is not
unique to GMOs because in the production of food, feed and seed, it is practically
impossible to achieve products that are 100% pure. Id.
117. Regulation 1829, supra note 8, at 5.
118. Regulation 1830, supra note 8, at 25.
119. Regulation 1829, supra note 8, at 3.
120. Id.at 11.
121. Id.
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produced from, GMOs in a proportion no greater than 0.9%122 of the
food ingredients considered individually or food consisting of a single
ingredient, provided that this presence is adventitious.1 23 To establish
that the GM content is adventitious, food producers must supply
evidence to various European authorities to ensure that2they
have taken
4
appropriate steps to avoid the presence of such material. 1
If the combined level of adventitious presence of GMOs in a food
product or in one of its components is higher than 0.9%, the food product
must bear a label disclosing the GMOs' presence. 25 Although the 0.9%
threshold enables consumers to see if a product contains a GMO, it only
does so if the product has more than 0.9% of GM content. Consequently,
food products containing 0.89% or less GM content may be sold without
consumer notification via labeling as long as that GM content is
authorized for sale in the EU.
(2)

"Unauthorized" GM Food Products

For products containing "unauthorized" GM content, the threshold
for such products must contain, consist of, or be produced from, GMOs
in a proportion no greater than 0.5%.126 In other words, the presence of
unauthorized GMOs in food is allowed up to a maximum
of 0.5%, below
127
enforced.
be
not
will
traceability
and
labeling
which
Like authorized GMOs, the presence of unauthorized material must
be adventitious and undergo a scientific risk assessment by the relevant
Scientific Committees or European Food Authority, which must
conclude that the GMO does not present a risk to human health and the
environment. 128 The EU claims this exemption aims to solve the
problem faced by operators who have tried to avoid GMOs, but find that
their products contain a low percentage of GM material due to accidental

122. Previously the threshold was one percent (1%). See Regulation (EC) No 258/97,
supra note 104, concerning novel food ingredients.
123. Regulation 1829, supra note 8, at 11.
124. Id.
125. Id. at 3.
126. Eight applications for GM foods are currently pending at different stages in the
authorization procedure, including products from GM maize, sugar beat and soy bean.
EU Commission Questions and Answers, supra note 73.
127. Id.
128. Id. Eight applications for GM foods are currently pending at different stages in
the authorization procedure, including products from GM maize, sugar beat and soy bean.
Id. A number of unauthorized GMOs have been assessed by the Scientific Committee
advising the European Commission as not posing a danger to environment and health, but
their final approval is still pending. Id. If a GMO does receive authorization, 1829 limits
the application of the 0.9% threshold to three years and provides that a detection method
must be publicly available. See Regulation 1829, supra note 8, at 7.
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contamination.
Prior to 1829's inception, there was no tolerance threshold for the
adventitious presence of GM material that had not been authorized by the
EU.130 As a result, the European market is now completely closed to
U.S. products such as maize, which might contain, at even a very low
level, constructs that have not been authorized in the EU.' 31 Curiously,
the logic dictating that certain GM products must be labeled will not
apply to products made with GM processing aids, such as GM enzymes
or yeast. 32 The European Parliament explained this discrepancy by
stating that these regulations "should cover
food ... produced 'from' a
133
GMO but not food... 'with' a GMO.
The determining criterion as to whether a product is produced
"from" or "with" a GMO is whether or not material derived from the GM
source material is present in the food. 134 For example, products obtained
from animals fed with GM feed or treated with GM medicinal products
will not be subject to the authorization or the labeling requirements
imposed by 1829.135 This leaves cheese, 36wine, and beer, in which
European exports remain strong, untouched. 1
b.

The mandatory labeling requirements under the EU system

Foods containing GM content above the respective threshold levels
will be subject to four labeling requirements.' 37 First, where the food
consists of more than one ingredient, the words "genetically modified" or
"produced from genetically modified (name of ingredient)" shall appear
in the list of ingredients 138 in parenthesis immediately following the
ingredient concerned. 39 Second, where the ingredient is designated by
the name of a category, the words "contain genetically modified (name
of organism)" or "contains (name of ingredient) produced from
129. Id. at 3.
130. EU Commission Questions and Answers, supra note 73, at 7.
131. More Trouble Ahead, supra note 13, at 5.
132. Regulation 1829, supra note 8, at 2.
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. More Trouble Ahead, supra note 13, at 5.
137. In addition to these requirements, labeling must not mislead the purchaser as to
the characteristics of the foodstuff and among other things, in particular, as to its nature,
identity, properties, composition, method of production and manufacturing. See
Directive 2000/13/EC, supra note 103, at art. 2.
138. Id. at art. 6.
139. These indications may appear in a footnote to the list of ingredients. See Council
Regulation 1829, supra note 8, at 11. In this case they shall be printed in a font of at least
the same size as the list of ingredients. Id. Where there is no list of ingredients, they
shall appear clearly on the labeling. Id.
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genetically modified (name of organism)" shall appear in the list of
ingredients. 40 Third, where there is no list of ingredients, the words
"genetically modified" or "produced from genetically modified (name of
4
organism)" shall appear clearly on the labeling.' '
Finally, the EU requires that labels list objective information that is
"in the interest of the consumer."' 142 This includes any characteristic 1or
43
property where a food is different from its conventional counterpart
with respect to composition, nutritional value, intended use of the food,
44
and health implications for certain sections of the populations.'
According to the EU, "objective information" even includes "any
characteristic or property
where a food may give rise to ethical or
145
concerns."'
religious
IV.

The Costs of the EU's Mandatory Labeling Framework

In the Summer of 2003, the European Parliament opined that in
order to "provide consumers with a real choice between GM food and
non-GM food, there should not only be a labeling system that functions
properly, but also an agricultural sector that can provide different types
of goods." 146 These words suggest that the food industry's ability to
deliver a high degree of consumer choice goes hand in hand with the
agricultural sector's ability to maintain different production systems. For
the EU's mandatory labeling system to be effective, therefore, farmers
and consumers must be able to cultivate or buy the types of products they
want at all times, be it GM crops, conventional crops, or organic crops.
This agricultural utopia illustrates the concept of coexistence, 47 in which
GM and non-GM products "coexist" in a marketplace where products
containing the threshold level of GM content are accurately labeled and
segregated.
140. Id.
141. Where the food is offered for sale to the final consumer as non-pre-packaged
food, or as pre-packaged food in small containers of which the largest surface has an area
of less than 10cm2, the information required must be permanently and visibly displayed
either on the food display or immediately next to it, or on the packaging material, in a
font sufficiently large for it to be easily identified and read. Id.
142. Id.
143. The labeling of foods falling within the scope of 1829, which do not have a
conventional counterpart, shall contain appropriate information about the nature and the
characteristics of the foods concerned. Id. at 12; see also European Frameworkfor
GMOs, supra note 9.
144. Regulation 1829, supra note 8, at 11.
145. Id.at 12.
146. See Commission Recommendation, supra note 11, at 36.
147. "Coexistence" refers to the ability of farmers and consumers to make a practical
choice between conventional, organic and GM-crop production, in compliance with the
legal obligations for labeling. Id.
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The following subparts discuss the problem with how the EU's new
labeling rules embody the concept of coexistence. Subpart A analyzes
how the EU failed to consider the realities of food production and the
costs imposed by mandatory labeling. Subpart B explains why 1829 and
1830's threshold levels provide bleak hope for consumer choice, and
why there will be no consistency among EU Member States over the
enforceability of such levels.
A.

How 1829 and 1830 Raise the Price of GM Food Products

1829 and 1830 impose a mandatory labeling system that increases
the cost of GM foods throughout the supply chain by requiring food
producers to segregate GM foods at each level of production. These
costs are transferred to the consumer or diminish the profit margin of
food producers. In either case, these costs make it difficult to compete
against non-GM products for market share and product placement in
stores. The result is a decrease in GM products in the marketplace and
the availability of products from which consumers may choose.
1. The Discrepancy in Cost between GM and Non-GM Food
Products
If there are two substantially similar products, in both quality and
brand from which to choose within a segment of the market, consumers
generally favor the less expensive of the two. 148 Due to the limited shelf
space in many stores, merchants only sell those products that consumers
generally favor. 14 9 Therefore, if there are two substantially similar
products, grocery stores will only sell the less expensive of the two
because consumers generally favor the less expensive product. 50
First,
The foregoing conclusion establishes three points.
consumer's propensity to purchase less expensive products provides no
incentive for merchants to sell more expensive, substantially similar
products within a given market segment. Second, although multiple
products may be available to consumers, they may really only choose
one. Third, although consumers may have independently chosen the less
expensive product, consumer choice has nevertheless been limited due to
the discrepancy of cost between the two substantially similar products.
1829 and 1830 create a discrepancy in cost between GM food
products and their substantially similar non-GM counterparts by
increasing the cost of GM products through mandatory supply chain and
148.
149.

MCCONNELL, supra

150.

MCCONNELL,

note 53, at 349.

BAINBRIDGE, supra note

6, at 38.

supra note 53, at 349-50.
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segregation costs. This discrepancy limits consumers' choice over the
range of products available to them because merchants do not have an
incentive to stock the higher priced, substantially similar, GM food. This
discrepancy will decrease the market share for GM food products and
create an additional burden for GM food producers to enter a
marketplace that they must already be authorized to compete within.' 51
2.

Supply Chain Costs of 1829 and 1830

The mandatory labeling requirements of 1829 and 1830 provide that
food producers must segregate products containing GMOs to prevent
contamination of foods that are intended to be free from GMOs. 5 2 This
requires GM and non-GM foods to be segregated 153 throughout all phases
of production, including planting, harvesting, processing, and retail
distribution. 154
Food producers must therefore create "expensive
separate transportation and processing streams for [GM] foods,"'155 which
will increase the cost of foods, eliminate economies of scale, 56
and
increase the potential for liability if a shipment is incorrectly labeled.
Given that many American and European food producers have
integrated their operations between GM and non-GM products,

57

it is

almost impossible to produce non-GM foods for the EU and GM foods
for the rest of the world. 15 The EU labeling framework is akin to a tax
on manufacturers, distributors, and retailers who must now segregate
their supply between GM and non-GM products. 159 These segregation
costs can be so significant that they
may inhibit future research and
160
development in this biotechnology.
The levels at which segregation costs fall compose the supply

151. See Regulation 1829, supra note 6, at 7.
152. Manufacturers also claim that increased costs may prohibit the development of
new and improved biotech food. See Europe Passes Tough Laws, supra note 10.
Moreover, passing the additional costs on to consumers may create barriers that prevent
those who cannot afford the increase in price from reaping the benefits of biotech food.
Id.
153. "Segregation costs" refers to the cost of physically separating productions, while
the term "traceability costs" refers to those costs of systems for documenting the origins
and nature of food products. SANTANIELLO, supra note 28, at 240.
154. See, e.g., Henry I. Miller, A Rational Approach to Labeling Biotech-Derived
Foods, 284 SCIENCE 1471, 1472 (1999).

155. Rick Weiss, Next Food Fight Brewing is Over Listing Genes on Labels,
POST, Aug. 15, 1999, at A17.
156. See More Trouble Ahead, supra note 13, at 3.
157. SANTANIELLO, supra note 28, at 241.
158. Id.
159. EuropePasses Tough GM FoodLabeling Laws, supra note 10.
160. SANTANIELLO, supra note 28, at 245.

WASH.
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chain.1 61 The supply chain consists of five levels, beginning with seed
providers, who sell seeds to the second level, farmers. 162 Farmers, after
planting the seeds, sell their products to the third level, handlers and
distributors. 63 Handlers and distributors then distribute the products to
the fourth level, manufacturers and processors.' 64 Manufacturers and
processors sell their resulting products to the 165fifth and final level,
retailers, who then sell the products to consumers.
At each of the five levels, 1829 and 1830 require segregation to
ensure that GM foods are not mixed with non-GM foods. 166 As noted in
Part III, the EU requires segregation to keep the adventitious presence of
GMOs below a threshold 0.9% or a 0.5%, depending on whether the
GMO is authorized for sale in the EU. 16 7 These thresholds relate to cost
because they require food producers to perform tasks to keep the GM
content in their products below those levels. Such tasks include thorough
cleaning of machinery and sterilization of storage and transport facilities
every time GM food products
are used in machinery, stored in silos, or
68
transported in trucks.
The impact of segregation affects the supply chain because many of
the grain elevators and other storage depots that farmers bring their
harvests to do not have multiple bins or the capacity needed to keep GM
and non-GM varieties apart.' 69 Elevator operators must now clean their
equipment between batches to prevent any carryover of GM varieties
into conventional ones. 170 This task is costly, time consuming, and does
not contribute to the bottom line.
B.

The SuperficialSafety of 1829 and 1830

1829 and 1830 fail to establish a realistic system of traceability and
monitoring, leaving it up to EU Member States and food producers to
tackle the tough questions of enforcement.
The complexity of
enforcement arises from the fact that GM products and non-GM products
can be easily mixed with one and another, particularly in the
environment where cross-pollination of GM and non-GM crops occurs
naturally. 7 1 The practicality of a system that neatly separates the two is
161.
162.
163.
164.
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.
170.
171.

BAINBRIDGE, supra note

6, at 34.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 35.
Id.
Regulation 1830, supra note 8, at 28.
Regulation 1829, supra note 8, at 7.
Commission Recommendation, supra note 11, at 28.
SANTANIELLO, supra note 28, at 246-7.
Id.
WINSTON, supra note 51, at 241.
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thus questioned, leaving many to wonder whether the EU's mandatory
labeling scheme offers consumers more choice than the FDA's voluntary
system of labeling.
1.

"Traceability" Costs

In addition to segregation, 1829 and 1830's mandatory labeling
rules require business operators 172 to transmit and retain information
about products that contain or are produced from GMOs at each stage of
the placing on the market. 173 This process, called "traceability," is a
means to track products containing or produced from GMOs through the
production and distribution chains.' 74 In theory, traceability facilitates
verification of labeling claims and the withdrawal of products that
contain or consist of GMOs above the stated threshold levels. 175 In
practice, there is frequently no detectable difference between GM and
1829 and 1830 try to avoid this
non-GM products.' 76 Nevertheless, 177
reality by imposing five requirements.
First, food producers must have systems and procedures in place to
78
identify to whom and from whom products are made available.
Second, for GMOs intended for deliberate release into the environment,
food producers must transmit specified information on the identity of the
individual GMOs a product contains. 179 Third, for GMOs intended for
food or for processing, food producers must either transmit the specified
information mentioned above or transmit a declaration that the product
shall only be used as food or feed or for processing, together with the
identity of the GMOs that have been used to constitute the original
mixture from which the product arose.' 80 Fourth, for food produced from
GMOs, food producers shall inform the next operator in the chain that
the product is produced from GMOs.' 8 ' Finally, food producers shall
retain the information for a period of five years and make it available to

172. "Operator" means a natural or legal person who places a product on the market
or who receives a product that has been placed on the market in the Community, either
from a Member State or from a third country, at any stage of the production and
distribution chain, but does not include the final consumer. See Regulation 1830, supra
note 8, at 25.
173. Id.
174. EU Commission Questions and Answers, supra note 73, at 8.
175. Another objective of traceability systems is to monitor the potential effects on
the environment, where appropriate. Id.
176. WINTSON, supra note 51, at 219.
177. Regulation 1830, supra note 8, at 26.
178. Id. at 25.
179. Id. at 26.
180. Id.
181. Id.
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82
competent authorities on demand. 1
The five traceability requirements indicate that where production
starts with a GM seed, the company selling the seed would have to
inform any purchaser that it is genetically modified, together with more
specified information allowing the specific GMO to be precisely
identified. The company would also be required to keep a register of
business operators who have bought the seed. 183 Additionally, the farmer
would have to inform any purchaser of the harvest that it is genetically
modified and keep84a register of food producers to whom he has made the

harvest available. 1

According to the EU, the five traceability requirements will reduce
the need for sampling and testing of products, and "ensure that
consumers are fully and reliably informed about GMOs and the food
' 85
products, so as to allow them to make an informed choice of product.'
However, given the chilly reception that GM foods have received in
Europe, supermarkets and food processors have been reluctant to put GM
labels on their products. 186 Until recently, many food producers have
managed to avoid labeling requirements by buying their ingredients from
non-GM suppliers. 187 The EU's new mandatory labeling framework will
affect a far wider range of products and, along with traceability
requirements, bring new costs to food processors, and force
some food
88
producers to use GMOs in the production of their products.1
2.

Monitoring and Enforcement Costs

The problem of monitoring and enforcement of GM and non-GM
crops arise in three contexts. The first is that GM and non-GM crops

182. Id.at 27.
183. Regulation 1829, supra note 8, at 27.
184. Id.
185. Regulation 1830, supra note 8, at 25.
186. Some commentators claim that because some people do not want GM food a
valid reason exists to give those people the right to not buy GM food. This argument
against voluntary labeling ignores the fact that mandatory labeling merely purports to
label what is GM and what is not GM in a sort of laboratory environment. In reality, and
due to traceability costs, mandatory systems have difficulty tracing and separating those
foods that are GM from those foods that are non-GM. As a result, GM foods can become
mixed or mislabeled as "non-GM." This result invalidates those arguments that people
should have a choice, because even if one is under a mandatory system, he might be
choosing a product he believes is "non-GM" when in fact in actually contains GM
products. In effect, the consumer's choice is totally meaningless. See More Trouble
Ahead: New EU Rules Will Rile America, supra note 10, at 7.
187. G.Chandrashekhar, EU's GM Crop Norms May Affect Global Farm Trade: Two
Major Changes Will Affect More Than 90% of all GM Imports Into EU, FINANCIAL
TIMES, August 6, 2003, LEXIS, Nexis Library, Business Line.
188. Id.
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may be produced simultaneously or in successive years on a single
farm. 189 The second occurs when GM and non-GM crops are produced
on neighboring farms in the same year. 190 And the third exists when GM
and non-GM production types are used in the same region, but on farms
that are separated by some distance.1 9'
Regardless of the context, the problem with monitoring and
enforcing the EU's mandatory labeling system is the admixture between
GM and non-GM crops. This admixture occurs from pollen transfer
between neighboring fields,' 92 mixing of crops during harvest and postharvest operations, 193 transfer of seeds or other plant material during
transport or storage, 194 and "volunteers," which are those seeds
remaining in the soil after harvest and producing new plants in
successive years.19'
The cumulative effects of the various sources of admixture,
including cumulative effects over time that may affect the seed bank or
the use of farm-saved seed, 196 present a major problem for the
enforcement of 1829 and 1830. For example, the adventitious presence
of GMOs above the tolerance threshold triggers the need for a crop that
197
was intended to be a non-GM crop, to be labeled as containing GMOs.
The result will likely be a loss of income, due to a lower market price of
the crop or difficulties in selling it.
Unlike the voluntary system of labeling, the EU imposes on farmers
additional costs to adopt monitoring systems that will minimize the
admixture of GM and non-GM crops. 198 These added admixture costs
distract farmers' ability to choose the production process and labeling
schemes that maximize profit and enable consumers to make choices
based on price and quality.
189. Commission Recommendation, supra note 11, at 34.
190. GM crops can co-exist, ARABLE FARMING, May 13, 2003, at 2; see also GM
Maize Field Trial Sites Carry ContaminationRisk, FARMERS GUARDIAN, March 22, 2002,
at 6.
191. Id.
192. Genetic Engineering: Short Distance Between Crops is Enough to Limit Gene
Transfer, EUROPE ENVIRONMENT, December 18, 2003, at 631.

193. Kershen, Drew L., Legal Liability Issues in Agricultural Biotechnology, CROP
SCIENCE, March 1, 2004, Section No. 2, Vol. 44, at 456-67.
194. See, e.g., Marty Wingate, GardeningFrom Seed Can Sprout Into Passion as You
Replant and Reap Another Harvest, SEATTLE POST-INTELLIGENCER, October 16, 2003, at
E6.
195. See, e.g., Walter Reeves, Herbicide Wipes Out Chamberbitter,THE ATLANTA
JOURNAL-CONSTITUTION, August 21, 2003, at 5HG.

196. Farm Saved Seed: Are You Really Saving With Seed?, ARABLE FARMING, July
29, 2003, at 25.
197. See Regulation 1829, supra note 8, at 7.
198. See Biotechnology: Recommendations on Co-Existence of GM and Non-GM
Crops, EUROPE INFORMATION SERVICE, July 26, 2003, at 2796.
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1829 and 1830 were approved by the European Council despite
these concerns and whether the regulations can be effectively
enforced. 199
Particular concern was expressed for highly-refined
products like vegetable oil, where the presence of DNA cannot be
detected in the final product. 200 As GM technology spreads it will
become more difficult for food producers to identify GMOs and state
with precision the amount of GM content contained in their products.2 1
Adding to this difficulty is the cost of tests to determine if products are
GM free, which can be slow and even unreliable.20 2
Under the new rules, EU Member States are responsible to ensure
that inspections and other control measures such as sample checks and
testing2°3 are carried out in compliance with 1829 and 1830.204 They
must also form the rules on penalties applicable to infringements of 1829
20 6
and 1830,205 which must be effective, proportionate and dissuasive.
The EU has remained silent as to the meaning of these words, enabling
Member States to define them based on their own readings of 1829 and
1830. This leaves open the possibility that different states, throughout
the EU, will impose varying amounts of liability, with no consistent
application.
V.

A.

Working Within and Around The EU's Mandatory Labeling
Regime
Keeping Your Client's Priceof GM Products Competitive:
Addressing The Supply Chain and Segregation Costs of 1829 and
1830

The conditions under which American and European farmers work
are extremely diverse. 0 7 Farm and field sizes, production systems, crop
rotations and cropping patterns, as well as natural conditions, vary

199. Id.
200. Id.
201. See PENCE, supra note 32, at 256.
202. Id.
203. Id. Some tests require sophisticated laboratory equipment that can cost
anywhere from $400-$700 (U.S.) per sample, and take 3 to 10 days to complete. See
James W. Stave and Donald Durandetta, GM Crop Testing Grows Amid Controversy,
TODAY'S CHEMIST AT WoRK, at 37 (2000).
204. Regulation 1830, supra note 8, at 27.
205. Member States shall notify such provisions to the EU Commission not later than
April 18, 2004, and shall notify the EU Commission "without delay" any subsequent
amendment affecting them. Id. at 28.
206. Regulation 1829, supra note 8, 21.
207. SANTANIELLO, supra note 28, at. 259.
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enormously between the U.S. and Europe.2 °8 Lawyers representing food
producers should communicate this variability to EU Member States who
must develop supply chain and segregation measures "in a transparent
evidence and in cooperation with all
way, based on scientific
20 9
concerned.,
stakeholders
Industry lawyers should seek supply chain measures that are
efficient, cost-effective, and proportionate so that an equitable balance
between the interests of farmers of all production types can be achieved.
This means that lawyers should advise their clients not go beyond what is
necessary in order to ensure that adventitious traces of GMOs stay below
the tolerance thresholds.
Practitioners might encourage their clients to specialize in the
production of either GM or non-GM outputs at each stage in the supply
chain. As discussed in Part IV, balancing both types of crops adds to
production cost and complicates the traceability and labeling process.
The costs of segregation become less significant as specialization
increases, 2 10 so food producers might be well advised to decrease their
overhead costs and maintain facilities for GM or non-GM products,
rather than trying to manage both.
Other considerations include farm-level management measures
aimed at coordination between neighboring farms. Lawyers should ask
their clients about the neighborhood in which they operate in order to
reduce costs related to the segregation of GM and non-GM production.
Lawyers may consider using "voluntary agreements, 2 11 with neighboring
farms to plan the use of crop varieties with different flowering times,
arrange for differences in sowing dates in order to avoid cross-pollination
during flowering, and to coordinate crop rotations.
Voluntary agreements may also establish minimum isolation
distances between fields with the same crop to prevent pollen flow. This
can be accomplished using minimum isolation distances between fields
with the same crop to prevent pollen flow to neighboring fields. These
agreements can thus have synergistic effects by combing techniques to
facilitate food production, such as scheduling different flowering times,
using crop varieties with reduced pollen production, and notifying farms
located within the relevant perimeter of the planting plans for the next
growing season.212
208. Id.
209. Commission Recommendation, supra note 11, at 36.
210. See, e.g., Namrata Nadkarni, Brazil's Soya May Soon Rival US Harvest,
LLOYD'S LIST INTERNATIONAL, October 8, 2003, at 4.
211. See Allison A. Freeman, GM Wheat Poses Economic Risk for U.S. Farmers,
GREENWIRE, October 31, 2003, LEXIS, Nexis Library, E & E Publishing.
212. Id. For open pollinating crops, such as oilseed rape, larger distances are
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Industry practitioners should also note that isolation distances
should minimize but not necessarily eliminate gene flow by pollen
transfer. 2 13 The objective is to ensure a level of adventitious presence
below the tolerance threshold.214 Isolation distances should therefore be
adapted according to the thresholds discussed in Part III. Lawyers might
coordinate this adaptation by recommending that their clients establish
2 15
"buffer zones" as an alternative or complement to isolation distances,
pollen traps or barriers, suitable crop rotation systems,216 planning the
crop production cycle,217 or the use of selective herbicides or integrated
weed control techniques.218
B. Addressing the Costs of 1829 and 1830
As a result of the potential economic loss and impact of the
admixture of GM and non-GM traceability, industry lawyers should
advise their clients on and the most appropriate traceability management
measures to minimize admixture. Strategies and best practices for
traceability need to be developed and implemented in conjunction with
Member States, along with the participation of farmers and other
stakeholders.2 19
Lawyers should insist that their clients be able to choose the
production type they prefer, without being subject to change alreadyestablished patterns in the neighborhood. Lawyers should also insist that
during the phase of introduction of a new production type in a region,
farmers who introduce the new production type should bear the
responsibility of implementing the actions necessary to limit admixture.
Traceability systems should also encourage farmers to report
problems or unexpected occurrences in the implementation of
required. For self-pollinating crops and plants where the harvested product is not a seed,
such as beets and potatoes, shorter distances are possible. Id. Notifications should be
made before the seeds for the next growing season are ordered. Id.
213. Steve Connor, Study Reveals First Evidence that GM Superweeds Exist, THE
INDEPENDENT, October 10, 2003, at 4.
214. Id.
215. See Deborah B. Whitman, Genetically Modified Foods: Harmful or Helpful?,
Cambridge Scientific Abstracts, at http://www.csa.com/hottopics/gmfood/ overview.html
(Apr. 2000) (last visited Nov. 19, 2003); see also Lonie Boens, Glyphosate-Resistant
Soybeans: An Introduction, 6 GREAT PLAINS NAT. RESOURCES J. 36, at 465-46 (2001)
(noting that buffer zones of 660 feet in width should protect non-GM crops from cross
pollination by GM pollen).
216. See, e.g., Clarke Munsell Thomas, The Food WE Are About To Receive;
'Genetic Modification': Those Can Be Fighting Words, But Some Skeptical U.S. Farmers
Are Seeing A Middle Ground,PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE, August 13, 2003, at A19.
217. Id.
218. Id.
219. See Commission Recommendation, supra note 11, at 38.
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coexistence measures. Lawyers can use this feedback as a basis for
further adjustment and refinement of their client's strategies and
practices of traceability under 1829 and 1830.
To aid enforcement and monitoring efforts, industry lawyers should
lobby Member States for training courses for their clients to learn more
about mandatory labeling and its differences from voluntary systems.
This could provide technical knowledge for the implementation of
monitoring and enforcement measures, and enable lawyers to learn more
they can better assist them on
about their clients' needs so that
22 °
coexistence management measures.
Lawyers should consider these measures because farmers need to be
fully informed about the implications of adopting a particular production
type. This information is crucial in understanding their responsibilities
under 1829 and 1830, as well as assessing their risk of liability in the
event of economic damage resulting from admixture.
VI. Conclusion
The EU's mandatory labeling framework is an illusory promise to
the consumer. It promises a system of disclosure so that consumers can
make reasonable choices about the products they buy. The system rests
on producers' ability to neatly trace and label every GMO throughout the
supply chain and the accurately enforce GM content thresholds.
Although 1829 and 1830 seem to improve consumer information, they
so if misleading information is not delivered to the
may only do
1
22

consumer.

As the use of GMOs in food rises, producers will have difficulty
finding supplies that they can confidently label a GM free. 222
Unavoidably, many non-GM products will be mixed with GMOs, either
naturally through cross-pollination or accidentally during the handling
and distribution process. In light of this reality, 1829 and 1830 create a
system that misleads consumers by guaranteeing labeling thresholds that
are difficult to enforce based on the technical and costly nature of
enforcement.
1829 and 1830 may also have a significant impact on the production
and supply chain of food. It will be challenging and expensive for food
producers to conform to the labeling rules of each Member State, who
may alter the stringent requirements laid out in 1829 and 1830.223
Mandatory labeling regimes, like 1829 and 1830, thus lead to eradication
220.
221.
222.
223.

Id.
PENCE, supra note 32, at 256.
Id.
See Regulation 1830, supra note 8, at 27.
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of GM products in the marketplace, which does not improve consumer
choice.224 Research proves that even in the markets with the most
consumers concerned about GM products, there are some consumers that
are indifferent or positively oriented to GM products; 225 removing their
choice is as undesirable as not allowing consumers to avoid GM foods.
In the absence of a labeling system that does not impose supply
chain and segregation costs that raise the price of GM foods, which
prevent consumers from choosing between substantially similar GM and
non-GM products, it is impossible to predict how consumer preferences
will affect the demand for GM and non-GM foods.226 According to one
commentator, "[t]he difficulty is not whether to develop a labeling
system for GM foods, but rather how to develop a system that provides
real consumer choice. 227
The FDA's system of voluntary labeling, although it will not always
mandate that food producers label GM products, offers consumers with
the greatest range of choices. It respects the incentive of the butcher, the
brewer, or the baker to make money, which requires earning the trust of
the consumer by having a reputation for honest dealings and quality food
products. Establishing a sense of trust between the consumer and the
producer in the market for GM products is critical in promoting
consumer choice.
1829 and 1830 intervene with this symbiotic
relationship but promise the same results. The regulations undermine the
consumer-producer relationship by creating a system of illusory
guarantees with no practical foundation in the realities of food
production. In other words, the new EU labeling framework is a castle in
the sky, picturesque in promise but paper-thin in practicality.

224. Press Release, AGCare, Voluntary Labeling of GE Foods Will Provide Choice
for Consumers and Marketing Opportunities for Producers (September 9, 2003), at
http://www.newswire.ca/cgi-bin/inquiry.cgi?OKEY=34303 (last visited Nov. 19, 2003).
225. Angus Reid, Consumer Attitudes to GM Food, THE ECONOMIST WORLD POLL
(1999) (indicating that between 57% and 82% of consumers in the EU and North
American would be less likely to buy GM labeled products if labels were used. In
contrast, only 5-37% of consumers would be more likely to buy food labeled as
"genetically modified"). Id.
226. PENCE, supra note 32, at 258.
227. Id. at 259.

